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We explain the diversity of corporate hedging behavior in a single model. The hedging ratio is 
obtained by maximizing expected utility that is a combination of the corporate level utility and 
a component that models the incentives of the financial manager. We derive a theoretical model 
that gives back the classic result of the literature if the financial manager has no other incentive 
than to maximize corporate utility. In the case the financial manager expects that his evaluation 
will be based exclusively on the financial profit (the profit of the hedging transactions), being 
risk averse, he decides not to hedge at all. The hedging ratio depends on the weight of these 
contradictory effects. We test our theoretical results on Hungarian corporate survey data. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The results of the empirical studies show that corporations are very diverse in their hedging 
solutions. They use selective hedging, the hedging instruments and hedging ratio varies not 
only across industries and firms, but they are not stable in time within a given firm either 
(Brown and Khokher, 2007). 
The classical models of optimal hedging ratio (Holthausen, 1979, Rolfo, 1980) assume a one-
period expected utility maximization framework, where the utility function is supposed to be 
concave. In the mean-variance model of Rolfo (1980), the optimal hedging ratio (w) – shown 
in Equation (1) - is determined by the expected value of the hedge (E(y)) (speculative part) and 
the covariance of the underlying asset (x) and the hedging instrument, that is the pure hedge. 
Here the hedging instrument is supposed to be costless. 
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where a stands for the corporate specific risk aversion, while the variance is denoted by var. 
For the uninformed hedgers, the hedging ratio should be equal to the second part of the equation 
(Duffie, 1989), which suggests perfect hedge or full hedge if there exist a perfectly correlating 
forward product. In practice, however non-financial firms use derivatives not only for variance 
reducing purposes and the hedging ratio varies from zero-hedge to full hedge and even 
overhedge that is not justified by different expectations. 
Several studies explain the question of corporate hedging from the perspective of the 
management. Financial manager optimizes his lifetime expected utility (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976), or aims to reduce the volatility of his own revenues (Stulz, 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
Another managerial factor influencing the hedging behavior of the firm can be the aim of good 
managers to reduce information asymmetry (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995, Breeden and 
Viswanathan, 1998) or the manager acts to minimize the regret on the hedge (Michenaud and 
Solnik, 2008). 
Although the hedging of market risk aims to reduce the volatility of the total profit and loss of 
the corporation, hedging derivative transactions cause a fluctuation in the financial profit unless 
the firm applies hedge accounting. DeMarzo and Duffie (1995) shows that managerial and 
shareholder incentives can differ based on the available accounting information. In the case the 
firm reports only aggregate earnings, managers hedge more as they do not face the trade-off 
between the volatility of the total profit and the financial profit.  
Several empirical studies examine the impact of the accounting standards on the corporate risk 
management practice. 
Table 1: Impact of the accounting rules on risk management. 
Research Sample Period Findings 
Panaretou et al., 
2013 
UK non-financial firms 
(FTSE 350) 
2003-2008 Hedge accounting reduces 
dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. 
Glaum and 
Klöcker, 2011 
German and Swiss non-
financial corp. 
Accounting rules influence 
hedging behavior. 
Hughen, 2010 105 US non-financial 
firms 
2007 Change in management behavior 
following a change in accounting 
method. 
Joseph, 2000 UK multinational firms 
(75) 
Use of certain hedging techniques 
is associated with increases in the 
variability of some accounting 
measures. 
The aim of this paper is to model the optimal hedging ratio chosen by the manager considering 
the trade-off between the volatility of the financial and the overall profit of the firm. We build 
a model that captures the different motives of the hedge in a mean-variance framework. As a 
special case we receive back the results of the classical models, however the experienced variety 
of the hedging ratio can be better explained in our model. 
The structure of the paper is the following: the next section describes the model and its 
extensions, then we analyze the results of a survey to find evidence on the theoretical model. 
THE MODEL 
We analyze an exporting firm who invests capital in the domestic currency, and sells its product 
in the foreign currency. The firm is therefore exposed to currency exchange risk. The quantity 
of the product is deterministic, however both the foreign currency price and the exchange rate 
are stochastic. We assume that the current foreign denominated price and spot exchange rate 
ensure the expected level of the profit, therefore the firm is exposed to two stochastic variables: 
r that is the percentage change (effective return) of the price and s denoting the  percentage 
change of the exchange rate.  
Our model describes a one-period decision: in time zero the firm decides to hedge a given part 
of its exposure, by selling it on forward. The forward price is supposed to equal the current spot 
price. The hedging ratio h is expressed as a percentage of the invested capital. The hedging ratio 
(h) is determined to maximize the expected utility (E(U)). 
𝐸(𝑈) → 𝑚𝑎𝑥ℎ 
The corporate utility is based on the classical mean-variance model: 
𝑈(𝑥) = 𝐸(𝑥) −
1
2
∙ 𝛼 ∙ 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑥) (1) 
where the utility is the function of the profit expressed as a return of the invested capital. As 
described in the introduction there are several levels of the profit and loss report: 
Corporate profit/loss on one unit of invested capital 
o operating profit: r+s3
o financial profit: -h*s
o corporate net profit: r+(1-h)*s
Rational corporate risk management of course should be based on the corporate net profit. 
However, the financial manager faces the problem that his performance may be evaluated based 
solely on the financial profit, rather than on the corporate net profit. We represent this 
3 for the sake of simplicity we disregard the cross-product deriving from (1+r)*(1+s) 
uncertainty in our model with the parameter 𝜆 which is the probability of the net profit-based 
evaluation. Thus, 1 − 𝜆 is the probability that only the financial profit will be taken into 
account. Mathematically this means that the profit relevant for the hedging decision becomes a 
random variable: 
 
𝑥 = {
    𝑟 + (1 − ℎ) ∗ 𝑠 with probability 𝜆
−ℎ ∗ 𝑠     with probability 1 − 𝜆
    (2) 
 
We apply the mean-variance utility on this variable. The expected value is: 
 
𝐸(𝑥) = 𝜆 ∗ (𝐸(𝑟) + 𝐸(𝑠)) − ℎ ∗ 𝐸(𝑠)   (3) 
 
After some tedious but straightforward calculation, we obtain the variance as: 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑥) = 𝜆{𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑟) + (1 − ℎ)2𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑠) + 2(1 − ℎ)𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟, 𝑠)} + (1 − 𝜆)ℎ2𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑠) +
𝜆(1 − 𝜆)(𝐸(𝑟) + 𝐸(𝑠))
2
   (4) 
 
The utility thus becomes: 
 
𝑈 = 𝜆 ∗ (𝐸(𝑟) + 𝐸(𝑠)) − ℎ ∗ 𝐸(𝑠) −
𝛼
2
[𝜆{𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑟) + (1 − ℎ)2𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑠) + 2(1 −
ℎ)𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟, 𝑠)} + (1 − 𝜆)ℎ2𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑠) + 𝜆(1 − 𝜆)(𝐸(𝑟) + 𝐸(𝑠))
2
]   (5) 
 
We find the optimal hedging ratio by differentiating with respect to ℎ and setting to zero. We 
obtain: 
 
ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 𝜆 (1 +
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟,𝑠)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑠)
) −
𝐸(𝑠)
𝛼 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑠)
    (6) 
 
Recognizing 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟,𝑠)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑠)
 as the regression coefficient 𝛽 between 𝑟 and 𝑠, we can rewrite our result 
as: 
 
ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 𝜆(1 + 𝛽) −
𝐸(𝑠)
𝛼 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑠)
     (7) 
 
The appearance of the 1 + 𝛽 factor has a straightforward interpretation: if the price change 
correlates positively with the exchange rate changes, a higher hedging ratio is optimal, as the 
two stochastic factors compensate each other. We note that in most cases, a product’s price and 
a currency does not show much correlation, therefore this adjustment is usually small in 
practice. In the subsequent analysis, we assume 𝛽 = 0, and consider the simplified formula: 
 
ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 𝜆 −
𝐸(𝑠)
𝛼 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑠)
     (8) 
 
If λ equals to 1, meaning the financial manager has no other incentive than maximizing the 
corporate net utility, the first term is 1, suggesting a full hedge of the production. This result is 
the same as the classic model of Rolfo (1980) suggests, if the hedging instrument correlates 
perfectly with the risk factor. If λ equals to zero, that means the decision making is based 
exclusively on the financial risk of the hedging position, in this case the term is zero. This result 
corresponds to the intuition that for a risk averse actor in the absence of any expected value of 
the hedge, the only goal is the volatility reduction that can be achieved by full hedge if the 
overall profit is considered, but by zero hedge if only the financial profit is considered. 
The second term is proportional to the expected exchange rate movement and can be interpreted 
as a speculation term. Note the negative sign. If the manager expects the rate to go up, the firm 
wants to profit from it, therefore he tends to hedge only partially. If rates are expected to go 
down, the manager may even over-hedge to reap financial profit from the hedging position.  
If in addition to our original assumption, we take into account a proportional financial hedging 
cost (bid-ask spread or transaction cost) 𝑐, our result for the optimal hedging ratio generalizes 
to 
 
ℎ𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 𝜆(1 + 𝛽) −
𝐸(𝑠)
𝛼 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑠)
−
𝑐
𝛼 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑠)
   (9) 
 
Comparison with the previous result (see Equation (7)) shows that the hedging cost has a similar 
effect as the expected exchange rate movement, but it always decreases the optimal hedging 
ratio. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
A straightforward way of testing our model is to find evidence whether firms applying hedge 
accounting rules hedge more. Hedge accounting allows for reporting the profit and loss of 
hedging transaction together with the operating profit, consequently the financial profit 
fluctuation is not influenced by the hedging activity. In that case the manager’s decision can be 
considered as if they were evaluated exclusively based on the net profit of the firm. 
As firms has no standard reporting obligation about their hedging activity, data on corporate 
hedging practice can be obtained either from the appendices of the financial statements or from 
direct approach of the companies.  
We conducted a survey on the corporate hedging practice among the active treasury clients of 
the Hungarian branch of a multinational commercial bank during the summer of 2013. In the 
framework of the survey about 100 large corporate clients – covering almost the whole 
population - were contacted and we received 29 answers.  
The hedging ratio that is the hedged portion of the total exposure can be seen in Figure 1. The 
frequencies are in blue columns if the firm applied hedge accounting, while the red histogram 
shows the distribution of the hedge ratio if hedge accounting was not applied. 
 
Figure 1: Hedging ratio according to the usage of hedge accounting 
 
 
In the above sample the average seems to be similar as it is also confirmed by the analysis of 
the variance. Although there is a difference of 7 percentage point in the expected value, but this 
is not significant due to the small sample size. 
 
Table 2: ANOVA table of hedging ratio according to the accounting rules 
  Hedge accounting yes Hedge accounting no 
Expected value 73.33 66.32 
Variance 1416.67 1224.56 
Observations 6.00 19.00 
Expeected difference 0.00 
 
df 8.00 
 
t-value 0.40 
 
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.35 
 
t- threshold 1.86 
 
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.70 
 
t-threshold 2.31   
 
The questionnaire also contained questions about the maturity of the hedging derivative deals. 
Based on the results the maximum maturity was significantly larger if the firm applied hedge 
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accounting standards, but the average maturity of the hedging transaction was the same for both 
groups. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The paper aimed to explain the diversity of corporate hedging practice. We investigated the 
optimal hedging ratio from the perspective of the financial manager, who maximizes the 
expected utility of a combined utility function. If the financial manager has no other incentive 
than maximizing the utility based on the total corporate profit, we receive the result of the 
classical models of the literature, according to which hedging has two components: the pure 
hedge and the speculation. In an unbiased forward market this suggest full hedge of the 
exposure. If the financial manager expects that his evaluation will be based exclusively on the 
financial profit (the profit of the hedging transactions), being risk averse, he decides not to 
hedge at all. The hedging ratio depends on the weight of these contradictory effects.  
To confirm the results, we investigated the hedging ratio of the Hungarian large corporations. 
We found that the firms applying hedge accounting hedge more, but this difference was 
insignificant due to the small sample size.  
Our model can be used to explain the different corporate hedging ratio according to sectors or 
ownership. The research is to be developed further by ex-post analyzing the hedging ratios in 
order to find the weight of the different manager incentives. 
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